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Abstract
How do suppliers of finance make sure that firm managers enforce credit contracts, or do not invest 
in bad projects? This approach is missing in corporate governance research. To bridge the gap, we 
take steps towards developing a stakeholder perspective with the focus on examining the effects of 
creditor participation in a firm’s top decisions, in relation to board performance. Based on a sample 
of 154 questionnaire survey responses from Nigerian public firms, after relating all measured items 
to every construct in the statistical tests of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), we employed the use of 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for an in-depth 
analysis to estimate how well the stakeholder model fits the data. Building upon the construct creditor 
participation, and based on the proposed theory, we confirmed three dimensions – protect risk projects, 
protect collateral, and enforce contracts – to be confirmed measures of the latent construct. Significant 
creditors such as banks interfering in the firm’s board, especially in major board decisions, can reduce 
the potentials of managers to engage in high-risk projects. This has significant positive effects on 
the board’s role performance. However, items in the two dimensions – protect collateral and enforce 
credit contracts show weak measurements after EFA. The consequences are a new research agenda 
for boards has been set. The agenda will focus on the suppliers of debt finance, as significant to the 
firms akin with their equity shareholders’ counterparts. This will create knowledge; reduce conflicts 
of interests, and exploitation; and ensure equitable distribution of firm value. The approach exposes 
firms to access more inclusive strategic inputs especially on important and less risky projects that will 
yield better margin and sustainable growth. This may stimulate further debates on other stakeholder 
researches that are vital to debt financiers and boards, thus becoming actionable for practitioners in 
decisions on projects.
Keywords: Corporate governance, board role performance, creditors, risk projects.
Introduction
In spite of the theoretical backing of the 
importance of suppliers of finance in the corporate 
governance structure, empirical evidence on 
governance discussion by large creditors is 
scarce. However, researchers find evidence of 
banks improving companies’ performance more 
so than other block-holders (Gorton & Schmid, 
1996; Kaplan & Minton, 1994). In Germany 
and Japan, the powers of the banks vis-a-vis 
companies are very significant because banks 
vote significant blocks of shares, sit on board of 
directors, play a dominant role in lending, and 
operate in a legal environment favourable to 
creditors (Jackson & Moerke, 2005). Even in 
the United States where equity shareholder is the 
focus in the governance structure, Gilson (1990) 
reports that banks play a major governance role 
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in bankruptcies, when they change managers and 
directors. In addition, De Long (1991) points 
to a significant governance role played by J.P. 
Morgan partners in the companies they invested. 
Important questions are: How do the creditors 
get managers to return some of the profit to 
them? How do they make sure that the managers 
do not steal the capital they supply or invest in 
bad projects? Unlike highly-trained employees 
and managers, the initial debt investors have no 
special ability to help the firm once they have 
parted with their money. Their investment is sunk 
and nobody – especially the managers needs 
them (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Yet despite all 
these problems, outside finance occurs in almost 
all market economies, and on an enormous scale 
in the developed markets. Some reasons given 
in the literature are managers deliver on their 
agreement to pay back because of reputation-
building (Diamond, 1991) and investor 
opportunism (Kaplan & Stein, 1993). Is the 
situation in emerging markets such as Nigeria the 
same? Apparently, procedures for turning control 
over to the banks are neither established based on 
existing law (e.g. Germany) nor on conventional 
norms (e.g. Japan), and worst still, the legal 
protection is not guaranteed (Okike, 2004) as 
well due to influences of personal interests and 
slow legal processes (World Bank, 2004). In line 
with the empirical evidence, which shows that 
banks improve company performance (Gorton 
& Schmid, 1996; Kaplan & Minton, 1994); 
and with the recent Central Bank of Nigeria is 
proactive stance on regulatory guidelines for 
Islamic banking, there are emerging Islamic 
corporate governance issues. Will the recognition 
of significant creditors at the top investment-
decision processes of firms result in effective 
board performance for Nigerian firms? 
Literature Review
Banks and Corporate Governance Structure
It is obvious that the Islamic mode of operations 
in financing differ significantly from its 
conventional counterparts, thus a different 
paradigm in the viewpoint of corporate 
governance. In the conventional literature, some 
scholars (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Whitley, 
1999) inclined to believe that the success of 
the Japanese economy prompted the question 
whether the Japanese corporate governance 
model (stakeholder perspective) deserved to be 
considered as an alternative to the shareholder-
focused model. Firms in Japan were provided 
with financial support by the government 
through the network of financial institutions, 
known as the convoy system, in which the main 
bank played the key role (Chaithanakij, 2008). 
The system empowered the main bank to play 
a critical role in monitoring the firms, which 
then resort to some risky business transactions, 
including involvement with the real estates and 
securities business. The system was in balance 
and it worked well. Government protection 
combined with cheap funds encouraged fast and 
steady industrial development (Freedman, 2007). 
However, Aoki (2001) opined that the role 
of the main bank, which had been the strong 
pillar of the Japanese corporate governance, has 
gradually disappeared. The declining role of the 
central bank, which once used to be an effective 
control mechanism for firms (Aoki, 2001), has 
caused an unprecedented risk in the Japanese 
corporate governance landscape by knocking 
the high-level corporate power structure out of 
balance. Each large Japanese firm maintains 
a long-term relationship with one large bank, 
known as its main bank that acts as an outside 
monitoring institution beyond a financial service 
provider with the capacity to provide soft loans 
to ailing banks, and bail-out financially distressed 
banks and other financial trouble-laden firms 
(Chaithanakij, 2008). 
They also punished failed management by 
replacing it with their own officers or other trusted 
bankers. This provided a credible discipline on 
the management of financial and non-financial 
firms (Aoki, 2001). Perhaps due to the burst of 
the economic burble in early 1999 that caused 
widespread bankruptcy in real estate firms and 
financial institutions, there were failures among 
the successful firms which sought bail-outs by 
the government through the convoy system. The 
strong criticism from the media against alleged 
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favouritism has brought the convoy system to a 
halt, along with the declining role of the main 
bank within the corporate governance landscape 
(Aoki, 2001; Freedman, 2007). 
The participatory role of a financier (bank 
or any debt investor) to companies largely 
depends on the prevailing legal framework in 
the country. For example, Jackson and Moerke 
(2005) observed that despite broad similarities 
in Germany and Japan, the legal framework is a 
key area of difference. The two-tier board system 
in Germany reflects strong legal intervention 
into the internal make-up of the enterprise in 
order to promote effective checks and balances 
between management and shareholders. These 
non-contractual rights and obligations based 
on law contrast sharply with the informal 
arrangements of employee participation in 
Japanese firms, as well as the lack of separation 
between monitoring and management functions 
within Japanese boards. As a result, Japanese 
boards are more hierarchically structured, with 
decision-making focused on a group of senior 
representative directors under the CEO, and the 
focus is on longer-term profits to provide steadily 
growing benefits to its permanent employees 
(Aoki, 2005). In Germany, the whole managing 
board has equal responsibilities, in principle, and 
more influence and more leeway to participate 
(Jackson & Moerke, 2005). 
In addition, corporate governance in Japan 
has a basic distinctive feature in that the main 
bank of a firm has had an important role as 
an efficient provider of funds, monitoring 
and disciplining the client firm, and assisting 
corporations to invest in more risky but high 
profit projects, which is termed the bank-based 
indirect financial system (Okabe, 2004). Thus 
the main bank system was an impelling force 
for the post-War high growth of the Japanese 
economy that attracted international attention 
in the 90s. After this, the World Bank initiated a 
large scale international research project on this 
type of financial system, publicised the research 
results, and recommended the suitability of this 
system to developing countries (Okabe, 2004). 
In this respect, Aoki (2001) praised the corporate 
monitoring role of the main bank system in 
Japan. However, Okabe (2004) observed that an 
increasing number of researches afterwards have 
shown, both theoretically and empirically, that 
the monitoring function of a main bank should, 
and in fact did, function not at any time but only 
when a set of conditions were satisfied. Table 1 
below is a summary of the two types of financial 
systems and their properties.
Table 1 
Anglo-American and Japanese-German Models
Anglo-American Model Japanese-German Model
Main financial transaction In the open market Bilateral transaction
Main funding instrument Securities Loan
Dependence on bank Low High
Nature of bank loan Short-term Short-term and long-term
Importance of internal funds High Low
Shareholding by banks Not important Important
Major shareholders Households, institutional 
investors
Banks, intercorporate shareholding 
Block share trading Frequent Not frequent
(continued)
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Anglo-American Model Japanese-German Model
Corporate control Stock market Main banks
Information processing Market acquires and 
distributes diversity 
of opinion and risk; 
information cost is low
Banks and client companies jointly 
own information by keeping long-term 
relationship; economies of scale in 
information acquisition
Allocation of risk Risk is dispersed broadly to 
various economic agents
Risk is essentially concentrated in banks
Performance characteristics More responsive to change Superior at implementing corporate policies 
that require agreements among various groups 
Suitable economic activity Developing new industries, 
new technologies and 
starting up new businesses 
(product innovation)
Improving the production process and 
efficiency of existing products (process 
innovation)
Industry examples Railways, computer and 
biotechnology
Automobiles and electronics
Source: Okabe (2004)   
Table 2
Sources of Funds of Private Non-financial Firms, Yearly Average in Trillion Yen
1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001
Acquired funds total 86.2 53.0 37.7
Internal funds 52.5 48.1 43.6
External funds 33.7 4.9 – 5.9
New stock issue 2.7 2.4 2.1
Debenture 2.7 – 0.8 – 0.7
Bank borrowing 28.3 3.3 – 7.3
Source: Okabe (2004)
Looking at the trend of events, an important 
question to ask is how has the financing pattern 
of Japanese corporations, on which stakeholder 
corporate governance structure is based, evolved 
recently? To get the answer to this fundamental 
question, a study conducted in Japan by Okabe 
(2004) reported statistics for 1990–2001 as 
shown in Table 2 below. The summarised figures 
revealed the following: (a) the total amount of 
funds acquired maintained a clear downward 
trend throughout this period; (b) internal funds 
have always had an overwhelming importance; 
(c) acquisition of external funds declined 
drastically; and (d) of all the external finance 
sources, bank borrowing rapidly decreased while 
equity funding remained rather stable (Okabe, 
2004).
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Nevertheless, in the two nations (Japan & 
Germany), unlike the Anglo-Saxon system that is 
fragmented among individuals and institutional 
investors oriented to financial gains from share-
price appreciation and dividends, Jackson and 
Moerke (2005) affirmed that there are striking 
similarities in terms of their corporate ownership. 
It is typically concentrated among a stable 
network of strategically oriented banks and other 
industrial firms, with interests in promoting inter-
firm cooperation, reducing risks, and generating 
relationship-specific rents; thus non-existent 
market for corporate control. Therefore, in these 
two societies, banks play the central external 
governance role through relational financing, 
combining debt and equity, providing financial 
services, and monitoring in times of financial 
distress – with Japanese main banks acting as 
delegated monitors through direct equity stakes, 
credit and dispatched directors (Sheard, 1994), 
while German universal banks are linked to 
credit, equity stakes, the exercise of proxy votes, 
and supervisory board representation (Edwards 
& Fischer, 1994).
Usually, financiers (Banks and other creditors) 
are involved in long-term and complex relations 
with industrial firms based on credit, large equity 
stakes, financial services and advice, representing 
shareholders as a delegated monitor or through 
proxy votes, holding seats on corporate boards, 
and being active in corporate rescues (Aoki & 
Patrick, 1994). Japanese main bank relationships 
were dramatically weakened as a consequence 
of the financial liberalization, which has 
eroded some rents from relational banking. 
Liberalization also eased the corporation’s access 
to external capital markets, greater access to the 
bond market, rising share prices that led to cheap 
equity finance and thus increased competition 
among financial intermediaries, consequently 
reducing the demand for bank credits (Jackson 
& Moerke, 2005). In this regard, the lending to 
smaller and riskier firms by banks resulted in a 
huge volume of poor-risk assets. As this banking 
crisis unfolded, and despite Japanese banks’ zero 
interest rate policy, banks reduced outstanding 
loans to meet capital adequacy ratios and created 
a credit crunch for smaller firms. This Japanese 
business model worked quite well in the past 
for industries of relatively low and moderate 
technology with stable market demand, but it 
does not seem to go hand in hand with rapid 
change in high technology sectors and those with 
uncertain business conditions (Chaithanakij, 
2008). 
On the wave of this interest, as Japanese banks 
were floating in the banking crisis, Germany was 
able to avoid a similar financial mishap. This 
attests to the importance of a country’s prudence 
regulations, bank-regulator relationship and risk 
management. German banks seem more willing to 
let major firms go bankrupt – in: Holzmann 1999 
and Walter Bau 2005, as seen in Jackson (2005), 
whereas Japanese banks remain more cautious 
about foreclosing on their clients. As large firms 
have become increasingly self-financing, usually 
through international equity markets, banks have 
sought to diversify from lending activities that 
generate interest based income to other types 
of fee-based income. For example in Germany, 
Deeg (1999) stated that private banks shifted 
away from industrial loans and deposits towards 
highly profitable investment banking services. 
This is a confirmation of an earlier assertion 
that the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank 
acquired British and US investment banks, 
shifted their equity holdings to subsidiary 
companies and divested from some large stakes 
(Jackson & Moerke, 2005). They further reported 
that banks were also slowly reducing their 
supervisory board seats: private banks held 20% 
of the seats in the largest 100 banks in 1974, but 
only 6% in 1993. The banks also faced growing 
dilemmas in maintaining traditional relational 
banking arrangements within a more market-
oriented financial environment. Sometimes, 
board representation led to conflicts of interest 
with the banks’ investment- banking activities 
(Hopner & Jackson, 2001). 
Interesting continuities in the relations of 
corporate governance and banks were pointed 
out by Vitols (2004), who observed that despite 
the attempt to modernise the financial system and 
promote a new one, Germany still remained a 
bank-centered financial system. Notwithstanding 
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the boom of stock market activity during the 
IT bubble in 1999 and 2000, levels of activity 
have rapidly declined; hence firms still show a 
strong demand for bank finance. The continuity 
is focused by explaining several institutional 
factors ignored by recent debates, such as 
households still having a very limited demand 
for purchasing equity; large group of middle-
income households preferring less risky assets 
such as bank deposits, unlike high-income 
households. Thus, the distinctive characteristics 
of Germany’s financial system are not merely the 
product of financial regulation, but are sustained 
by the complementary institutions that govern 
household income and investment, as well as 
industrial organizations.
Turning to Japan, Miyajima and Arikawa, as 
seen in Jackson and Moerke (2005), investigated 
the pattern of bank lending to firms in the 90s and 
its implication to corporate governance. They 
found that larger and successful firms listed on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) tend strongly 
towards capital market finance. The authors do 
not predict the demise of the Japanese main 
bank system; rather the future role of the banks 
depends strongly on the restructuring of the 
banking sector perhaps through complementary 
roles in corporate restructuring. All these factors 
may contribute to revitalising bank monitoring 
capabilities, which will make the threat of 
intervention credible for struggling client firms. 
Taken together, bank–firm relationships thus 
display both continuity and change (Jackson 
& Moerke, 2005). Meanwhile, firms with 
low growth prospects still depend on the 
banks to finance their investments. Such high 
concentration of bank loans to poorly performing 
firms, gives strong incentives for banks not to 
push the necessary restructuring onto the client, 
given the constraints placed on the struggling 
banks to avoid their own capital shortage. The 
main bank system thus lost its positive function 
as an effective incorporate monitor in the 90s, 
and revealed a dark side. The authors do not 
however predict the demise of the Japanese 
main bank system. The future role of the banks 
depends strongly on the restructuring of the 
banking sector through new bank strategies, 
recent banking mergers, policy measures to 
reduce bad loans, and complementary roles in 
corporate restructuring played by new private 
equity investors and reformed bankruptcy 
procedures. All these factors may contribute to 
revitalizing bank monitoring capabilities, which 
will make the threat of intervention credible for 
struggling client firms, they concluded. 
In sum, (Jackson & Moerke, 2005) opined that in 
both Germany and Japan, relationship-banking 
has not diminished completely, but has shifted 
towards different groups of firms. Banks are 
unlikely to regain their past monitoring capacity 
with regard to very large firms, but may continue 
to play a unique governance role among smaller 
credit-oriented firms. In addition, moves to 
market-based form of governance may have 
a potentially paradoxical result of weakening 
corporate accountability to the extent that banks 
play a weaker role as corporate insiders, but 
is not compensated for by more active role of 
outsiders. However, the regional differences of 
both countries will remain extremely important 
in mediating global pressures.
Currently, in the Nigerian business environment, 
no such similar arrangement exists either by law 
or conventional norms. As mentioned earlier, 
what is obtainable in the Nigerian context is 
the Anglo-Saxon model. However, empirical 
evidence found that both the German and 
Japanese firms’ business models worked quite 
well in the past for industries of relatively low and 
moderate technology with stable market demand 
(Chaithanakij, 2005). In other words, Japanese 
firms availed the full opportunity by the effective 
utilization of the stakeholder model when the 
economy was developing, which transformed 
Japan and Germany into developed or emerged 
status. Therefore, it may not be out of place for 
Nigerian firms to adopt with modifications such 
a successful system because Nigerian industries 
are relatively of low and moderate technology 
with stable market demand; perhaps the 
emerging economy can as well be transformed 
to a sustainable economic growth for placing on 
corporate boards supervisory sits for significant 
debt investors.  
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Board Role Performance
‘The phrase corporate governance is often 
applied narrowly to questions about the structure 
and functioning of the boards of directors’ (Blair, 
1995). This view was reflected in Donaldson 
(1990), who defines corporate governance 
as ‘the structure whereby managers at the 
organizational apex are controlled through the 
board of directors, its associated structures, 
executive incentives, and other schemes of 
monitoring and bonding’. While Tricker (1994) 
states: ‘Corporate governance addresses the 
issues facing the boards of directors, such 
as the interaction with top management, and 
relationships with owners and others interested 
in the affairs of the company, including creditors, 
debt financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate 
regulators’. 
In the literature, empirical evidences show that 
there is the need to re-examine some governance 
arrangements to improve the scenario. In this 
regard, managers have incentives to expropriate 
a firm’s assets by undertaking projects that 
benefit themselves personally but adversely 
impact shareholder wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  This means that the way of controlling the 
rights conferred on managers by large investors 
will have to be reduced. For example, cash flow 
rights are mechanisms of managerial control that 
can be mitigated by large investors’ concentrated 
ownership, but they have potential for abuse 
because large shareholders can expropriate 
wealth from the smaller shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).
In the literature on corporate governance, 
scholars are unanimous about the main 
functions of the board of directors that indicate 
their performance: board monitoring role, 
board service role, and board networking role. 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) define effectiveness 
as three board outputs: organizational outputs, 
group-level outputs, and individual outputs. 
They stress that group dynamics have a powerful 
effect on a team’s effectiveness, and so assessing 
board-focused outputs is vital to understanding 
how boards add value. By implication, 
Maharaj (2009) opines that any relationship 
between the board and corporate performance 
will be interceded by the effectiveness of the 
management team and the dynamics of the board 
of directors (BOD). To buttress the meaning of 
effectiveness, Sonnenfeld (2002) argues that 
exemplary boards are robust, effective social 
systems. This means extending their personal 
attributes and experience for social networking 
to be able to attract scarce resources that are 
beneficial for the organization.  
Board Monitoring Role
In the agency theory, the conventional 
understanding of the boards of directors is that they 
reduce the costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control especially in widely-
held firms owned by a large number of small and 
dispersed shareholders who need to delegate the 
responsibility of running the firm to professional 
managers. Since these shareholders find it costly 
and lack the incentive to monitor management, 
managers may behave opportunistically to run 
the firm according to their interests rather than 
that of the shareholders. Thus, Zuaini and Napier 
(2006) opine that agency conflict arises when 
the manager neglects the minority shareholders’ 
interests. Sarkar (2009) reports that managerial 
opportunism imposes agency costs, manifested 
in unobservable and often unverifiable actions 
taken by them such as expanding firm size 
beyond optimal level, consuming perquisites, 
or satisfying managerial hubris, all of which 
increase their private benefits but which reduce 
the value of the firm and hence the benefits to the 
shareholders. 
As a corporate democracy, directors (legislature) 
are elected by the shareholders (citizens), to 
monitor the managers (executives) in view of 
shareholder interests. This view challenges the 
shareholders’ choice of who should serve on 
the board to optimally fulfill these functions. To 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, 
the BOD defines a firm’s purpose, strategizes and 
draws up plans to achieve that purpose, appoints 
the CEO, monitors and assesses the performance 
of the executive team, and assesses their own 
performance (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). 
In other words, the most important function of 
the BOD is fiduciary duty to the shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
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Board Service Role
As defined by Wan and Ong (2005), board 
performance refers to the ability of the board to 
execute its role effectively and be transparent 
to the public. Monitoring and service are the 
two main board functions under the agency 
theory. Strategy planning is the most important 
board task under the strategic choice model. In 
addition to dealing with conflicts resulting from 
divergent preferences of stakeholder coalitions, 
board service role in the behavioural perspective 
emphasizes the board members. 
In terms of the board processes, a strengthening 
of the effort norms will make directors more 
aware and more willing to contribute to the 
performance of the board. In addition, a higher 
level of cognitive conflicts, which are task-
oriented, are likely to make the directors perform 
their roles better. With more skills and knowledge 
within the board, there should be more service 
and strategic planning outcomes arising from 
board activities. 
Boards of directors participate in the strategic 
decision-making process and support the top 
management in defining the strategic context of 
the firm (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). The board service 
task includes a set of related activities, such as 
evaluating and selecting strategic alternatives 
that have been developed by the top managers, 
providing advice to improve the quality of 
strategic decisions, and so on (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). A high level of service task performance 
is believed to have a positive impact on a firm’s 
long-term competitive advantage (Andrews, 
1980).
However, Stiles (2001) used a multi-method 
approach involving an in-depth examination 
of 51 directors of UK public companies, a 
survey of 121 company secretaries and four 
case studies of UK Plc, where multiple-board 
members were interviewed. Through the use 
of a grounded methodology, he examined the 
impact of the boards on strategy and showed 
that by establishing the business definition, gate-
keeping, selecting directors, and confidence 
building, the board influences the boundaries 
of strategic action. Evidence for the managerial 
domination of the boards was slight, but 
the results showed support for a number of 
theoretical frameworks, suggesting that multiple 
perspectives are required to fully understand the 
nature of board activity.
Similarly, in a related joint effort, board 
effectiveness through an examination of the work 
and relationships of non-executive directors, 
it was argued that while board structure, 
composition and independence condition board 
effectiveness, it is the actual conduct of the non-
executive directors vis-à-vis the executive that 
determines board effectiveness based on the Higgs 
review assessment (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 
2005). Interestingly, since empirical studies do 
not reveal a conclusive relationship between 
board structure and firm performance, attention 
has shifted towards board-role performance. 
In this regard, Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 
(1996) examined three conceptual models for the 
studying of board-role performance: structure, 
process and mediation models by developing 
17 propositions for empirical research. This is 
in contrast to previous research which largely 
investigated board-role performance in general 
or under the dominant-agency perspective which 
emphasizes the board’s monitoring role. Daily et 
al. (2003) for example, noted that “In addition 
to the monitoring role, directors fulfill resource, 
service, and strategy roles”. Examining all four 
roles together in a single study has the potential 
to provide a richer perspective into board 
research. They explicitly advocate the role of 
board process instead of the traditional structure-
performance. 
Second, the tradition of board members being 
cronies of the CEO has not disappeared, and 
boards often are reluctant to challenge a CEO, 
especially a powerful and successful one. 
They often feel obligated to the incumbent for 
recruiting them to the board and they often have 
strong social ties to the CEO (Johnson et al., 
1996; Ong & Wan, 2008).
In this respect, Ong and Wan (2008) conclude 
that understanding the nature of effective board-
role performance is among the most important 
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areas in management research. When boards of 
directors are seen as stewards of organizational 
resources that impact, for better or for worse, the 
whole of society, the importance of understanding 
and improving the way they discharge their roles 
becomes apparent. Hence, by treating boards as 
decision-making groups and drawing an existing 
knowledge of board and group dynamics, 
researchers can focus directly on what boards 
need to do in order to perform their roles more 
effectively.  
Board Networking Role
Networking refers to a system of trying to meet, 
talk and woo other business interests who may be 
critical to the firm’s survival and success. Outside 
directors with high prestige and high status are 
usually co-opted by managers to increase the 
acceptance of the firm within its operational 
environment (Johnson et al., 1996; and Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, representatives 
of external stakeholders, such as financial 
institutions can be co-opted in order to facilitate 
the firm’s access to scarce financial resources 
(Johnson et al., 1996).  
Stakeholder Theory
In contrast to the agency theory, advocates 
of the stakeholder theory argue that, a wider 
objective function of the firm is more equitable 
and more socially efficient than one confined 
to shareholder wealth (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 
1995; Kay & Silberston, 1995; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Collier, 2008; Sikka, 2008; and 
Fassin, 2009). They argue that, the well-being 
of other groups such as employees, suppliers, 
customers, and lenders, local community, who 
have a long-term association with the firm 
and therefore a stake in its long-term success, 
is recognized. These stakeholders are able to 
build trust relations, which support profitable 
investments and mutually beneficial exchanges 
(Kay & Silberston, 1995). They cite Japan and 
Germany as successful industrial societies in 
which extensive stakeholder involvement with 
the firm is pervasive, and corporate goals are 
defined more widely than shareholders’ profits. 
As a first line of criticism, it can be observed that 
this exclusive focus on the board’s monitoring 
tasks is at odds with both corporate law and 
corporate practice. Blair and Stout (1999) analyse 
US corporate law and argue that although it may 
be most efficient to have directors elected by 
shareholders, their fundamental responsibility is 
with the firm itself. Hence, the principal-agent 
representation of the corporation is at odds with 
the legal description of the firm as a separate 
entity. Similarly, the shareholders cannot be 
formally taken as principals. On the contrary, the 
board of directors itself is better conceived of as 
representing the top of the corporate hierarchy, 
and the board’s fundamental role is to mediate 
between all corporate stakeholders in situations 
where stakeholders’ interests do not necessarily 
coincide (Kostant, 1999). A broader view of 
director responsibilities is likely to lead to the 
inclusion of strategic tasks as well. Therefore, 
a study of what boards actually do, and how 
independence affects these tasks, calls for a 
broader conceptualization of board tasks as an 
important element of corporate governance.
A second line of criticism addresses two 
fundamental assumptions of the principal-
agent model. Firstly, interactions between board 
members and management are essentially seen as 
discrete events in the agency theory (Willenborg, 
van Ees & Huse, 2007). Consequently, decision-
making in discrete settings is most efficient in 
case all actors act as if they meet for the first 
time. In particular, the disutility of monitoring 
perceived by the board members should be 
minimal and unaffected by the interests of 
the managers. Hence, independent boards 
are required to optimize the quality of board 
decision-making. So, the emphasis is not on 
the process of decision-making itself, but on 
the result-oriented decisions of the board with 
positive impacts on firms.
Thirdly, human nature in the agency theory is at 
odds with real-world observations (Willenborg, 
van Ees & Huse, 2007). Human beings are 
assumed to be fully rational, capable and self-
interested agents. Although corporate governance 
scandals have shown that self-interest exists, it 
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is not out of place to ponder on the old-adage 
that ‘it is human to err’. Consequently, the 
assumption that all deviations from the goals 
are due to intentional misappropriation requires 
qualification (Hendry, 2005). This also implies 
that boards can be called upon to provide their 
expert advice to the management instead of the 
saint-devil impression.
Therefore, the assumption of the arm’s length 
bargain underlying the classical principal-agent 
model does not capture the social dynamics 
inside the boardroom. In addition, dispersed 
corporate ownership cannot be regarded as a 
sufficient condition for the conclusion that the 
interaction between the board and the managers 
is best conceived of as discrete events between 
anonymous actors. At best, the emphasis on 
board independence as a precondition of optimal 
control can be regarded as only one element of a 
more comprehensive picture of social interaction 
(Willenborg, van Ees & Huse, 2007). Boards 
can be considered as special working groups, 
of executives and non-executives, characterized 
by a cognitive output, complex decision-making 
and restrictive communication and operating 
procedures. The individual expertise and 
knowledge as well as the relational capital of the 
board members serve as inputs for the decisions 
of the board.
In addition, using the stakeholder theory, Collier 
(2008) focuses on regulators, lenders and tenants 
as other dimensions of corporate governance. 
Focussed entirely on employees, Sikka (2008) 
uses the stakeholder theory to assess the role 
and importance of workers within the system 
of corporate governance in the UK.  In spite 
of the theoretical backing of the importance 
of the suppliers of finance in the governance 
structure, empirical evidence on governance 
discussed by large creditors is scarce. However, 
researchers find evidence of banks improving 
companies’ performance more than other block-
holders (Gorton & Schmid, 1996; Kaplan & 
Minton, 1994). In Germany and Japan, the 
powers of the banks vis-a-vis companies are 
very significant because banks vote significant 
block of shares, sit on board of directors, play 
dominant roles in lending, and operate in legal 
environments favourable to creditors. In the 
United States, Gilson (1990) reports that banks 
play a major governance role in bankruptcies, 
when they change managers and directors. In 
addition, DeLong (1991) points to a significant 
governance role played by J.P. Morgan partners 
in the companies they invested. 
In Nigeria, where procedures for turning control 
over to the banks are not established based on 
existing law, and where legal protection is not 
guaranteed (Okike, 2004) as well as due to 
influences of personal interests or slow legal 
process (World Bank, 2004), the need to include 
large creditors in the investment-decision 
processes of firms cannot be over-emphasised, 
especially that empirical evidence show banks 
improve company performance (Gorton & 
Schmid, 1996; Kaplan & Minton, 1994). It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that:
H - Creditor participation on board is significantly 
related to Board Role Performance
Methodology
There is widespread recognition that a strong 
board aids adequate investor protection, and 
other relevant stakeholders that can substantially 
not only affect public firms, in their ability to 
commit to stakeholders, improve firm value, 
effective board performance, but also the 
development of capital markets and the growth 
of the economy in general (Jones, 1995; Sikka, 
2008; Bhagat et al., 2008; and Fassin, 2009). 
These developments sparked nations, academics 
and rating agencies develop many dimensions of 
corporate governance and indices for evaluating 
the quality of corporate governance practices in 
public firms. 
However, Figure 1 shows a theoretical 
framework model where the exogenous latent 
constructs (creditor participation) are represented 
by three reflective dimensions – protect risky 
contracts, protect collateral and enforce credit 
contracts, with 11 measurement items, while 
the endogenous latent construct (board role 
performance) is measured by 9 items. These 
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developments sparked nations, academics and 
rating agencies develop many dimensions of 
corporate governance and indices for evaluating 
the quality of corporate governance practices in 
public firms. As mentioned earlier, this study 
employs the use of confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) in a structural equation modelling (SEM) 
as the statistical technique to test how the overall 
model tests the data. In other words, indicators 
are associated with each latent construct and are 
specified by the researcher from an established 
theoretical framework (Hair et al., 2010). 
Protect Risky 
Contracts
Protect 
Collateral
Enforce Credit 
Contracts
Board Role 
Performance
  
    
         
    Figure 1.  Stakeholder theoretical framework of creditors.
The empirical study was carried out using public 
listed companies in Nigeria as the sample frame. 
Listed companies are chosen because they are 
regulated, easier to obtain data and are also more 
accurate since they are certified. The population 
of 318 Nigerian listed companies was targeted for 
the study, but a sample of 154 was achieved, of 
which 30% was considered adequate for further 
statistical analysis (Rea & Parker, 2005). As a 
first step, an informal chat with a few middle 
and high level managers and an overview of the 
study background in the literature confirmed that 
the questionnaire approach was appropriate and 
logical. All the data for the employee participation 
variables were obtained from responses to a 
5-points Likert Scale questionnaire. Great care 
was taken in adapting the questionnaire.
 
Instrumentation and Measurements
As a first step, a series of discussions with experts 
who possess relevant research experience in 
corporate governance were held. Thus, based 
on the research findings in the literature, the 
survey questionnaire items (refer to Table 1) 
for the construct were adapted and in some 
instances developed. In addition, the UK 
Innovation questionnaire largely influenced the 
adoption of some questionnaire items. Though 
we have not seen any previous efforts to test 
similar constructs, based on the proactive efforts 
embarked upon, the content validity was deemed 
adequate.
As a pre-test process, the research instrument 
was submitted to four senior academics with 
extensive combined experience in survey 
research. They were able to provide critical 
assessment of the content (face) validity of 
each item, as suggested by Rea and Parker 
(2005). These expert suggestions during the 
questionnaire design and revision process 
helped ensure a close match between the pre-test 
and the final version of the instrument. Piloting 
of the survey instrument was accomplished 
Sample
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by administering the questionnaire to a small 
sample (30) of respondents in Nigeria whose 
responses and general reactions were sought and 
examined. Luckily, all those that participated 
in the questionnaire pre-test were sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the issues of relevance to 
the field of inquiry. Among them were nine high-
level managers, one company secretary, and one 
CEO.
The questionnaire contained a total of 26 sets of 
statements including 4 demographic questions. 
Each of these sets of questions required a single 
response (tick as appropriate in the answer 
options 1-5) for each of a range of items. Each 
statement was rated by the respondents on a range 
of measures scaled from 1 “strongly disagree” to 
5 “strongly agree”. Greater scores mean a higher 
level of constructs. Items specific to a given 
construct were separated from each other in the 
questionnaire to minimize consistency bias and 
reduce any sense of repetitiveness. Additionally, 
each measure included at least one reverse-
coded item. The questionnaire cover motivated 
participation by suggesting the usefulness of the 
questionnaire as an evaluation tool for reflection 
on the participants’ own corporate experience, 
indicating the amount of time required to 
complete the survey, and assuring participants 
of anonymity and confidentiality. The field 
operation of these variables is discussed below.
Results: Data Analysis
All internal consistency reliabilities based on 
Cronbach’s alphas for the 5-point interval scale 
measurement items are better than the results in the 
pilot survey. In the main study, the three manifest 
Table 1
Reliability of Measurement Items
Board Role Performance (Endogenous Variable):
Measurement Items     Cronbach’s alpha
Monitoring (3 items)                                                                                                   0.777
The board engages in succession planning for CEO 
The board evaluates the performance of top executives 
The board controls plans and budget.
 
Service (4 items)                                                                                                         0.842              
The board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions 
The board takes long-term strategic decisions 
Board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions
Board benchmark strategic plan with industry data. 
Networking (2 items)                                                                                                  0.780
The board contributes to the acceptance of the firm in the environment 
The board provides contacts with relevant stakeholders. 
Creditor Participation (Exogenous Variable):
Risk (4 items)                                                                                                               0.814
Bank on firm’s board reduces potentials to squander credit funds on projects
Bank on firm’s board assures other financiers safety on their investments  
Bank participation in project decisions assures effective credit utilization
Debt investor rights to legal protection are disincentive to management misdemeanor.
(continued)
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variables measuring board-role performance and 
creditor participation are internally consistent 
with 0.777, 0.842, 0.780 & 0.815, 0.852, and 
.0.758 respectively. In this paper, the data 
analysis was conducted in two stages. First, as 
stated above, the scale reliability coefficient was 
calculated for each of the scales used in creditor 
participation and board-role performance. 
Cronbach’s reliability coefficients ranged from 
0.777 to 0.852. Since all the figures were above 
the 0.70 accepted threshold suggested by Hair et 
al (2010), it shows that the items achieved the 
accepted correlation level to retain them under 
each scale for further statistical analysis. In this 
respect, the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
using the principal component method with 
varimax rotation was conducted on both the board 
performance and creditor participation variables 
to examine their dimensionalties not based on 
any theoretical underpinning. Five items were 
removed because of low communality figures 
(< 0.5). The remaining measured items were 
confirmed using the CFA based on the proposed 
theoretical framework, and the relationships 
between creditor participation and board-role 
performance constructs were empirically tested 
using the structural equation modelling.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
In contrast to CFA, EFA does not require a priori 
hypotheses about how indicators are related to 
Board Role Performance (Endogenous Variable):
Measurement Items     Cronbach’s alpha
Collateral (4 items)                                                                                                        0.852
The use of high powered contracts is limited by fear of management self-dealing
Equity financing covered by sufficient collateral reduces debt-risk exposure
The use of high-powered contract is limited by optimal design of incentives
Dominant bank ownership influences management to pay back debts.
Enforcing Credit Contracts (3 items)                                                                           0.758
Bankruptcy law does not assure quick recovery to pay back debts of firms
Widely held equity investments facilitate debt financing
Large financiers are tough enough on managers despite inefficient legal system.
underlying factors or even the number of factors, 
hence the term “exploratory” (Kline, 2005). In 
other words, there is little direct influence on the 
correspondence between the indicators and the 
constructs. In this regard, Kline (2005) affirmed 
that EFA is not generally considered a member 
of the SEM family, though it is a statistical 
technique used for evaluating a measurement 
model. In this study, as a first step, EFA was 
performed to evaluate the questionnaire items 
that measure each of the latent constructs through 
an iterative process.
The exploratory factor analyses were carried out 
using the principal component analysis and the 
varimax rotational methods in order to extract 
the dominant factors and indicators within each 
factor that share common variance. The direct 
oblimin rotational method was not selected for 
this study because of its assumptions that the 
factors are correlated with one another. It is the 
correlation of factors that the study intends to 
confirm for the measurement model (CFA) after 
exploring for the study measures.
In this respect, three factors with an eigenvalue 
greater than five explained 67% of the variance 
for the construct creditor participation using 
the principal factor analysis. Two items were 
removed from the scale. The varimax-rotated 
factor pattern implies that all the three factors 
concerned – risk; collateral; and enforce 
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contracts with the 11-item scale (a = 0.693; 
KMO = 0.760; and < .001 Sig) measuring the 
construct present acceptable figures to build the 
(continued)
latent construct creditor participation for further 
statistical analysis. The result of the EFA for 
creditor participation is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2
EFA: Creditor Participation (Exogenous Variable)
Measurement Items Factor 
Loadings
% of Variance
Bank sit on firm’s board reduces the risk to squander credit funds  0.740 67%
Bank sit on board assures other financiers’ safety on investment 0.805
Board involving bank in project decisions assure credit utilization 0.846
Debt investor legal right is disincentive to CEO misdemeanor 0.796
Use of high powered contract is limited by fear of CEO self-deal 0.715
Financing backed with large collateral reduces debt-risk exposure 0.846
Use of powerful contract is limited by optimal design of incentive 0.892
Bank’s dominant debt ownership influences CEOs to settle debts 0.861
Powerful interest in banks preserve inefficient governance system 0.836
Bankruptcy law does not assure quick recovery of debts from firm 0.838
Widely held investments facilitate quicker financing approval 0.763
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Sampling Adequacy      .760
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: Appr. Chi-Square 657.631
df                                                                                      55
Sig.                                                                                   .000 
Eigenvalue        2.9
Cronbach’s Alpha (a) .693
       
Table 3
Board-role Performance
Measurement Items Factor Loading % of Variance 
Board controls plans and budget 0.788 66%
Board evaluates performance of top executives 0.850
Board engages in succession planning for CEO 0.696
Board takes long-time strategic decisions 0.680
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Measurement Items Factor Loading % of Variance 
Board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions 0.860
Board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions 0.686
Benchmark strategic plan with industry data 0.789
Board contributes to the acceptance of the firm in the 
environment
0.600
Board provides contacts with relevant stakeholders 0.762
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling  .893
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: Approx. Chi-Sq 680.081
36
Sig. .000
Cronbach’s Alpha (a)     .893
                                                                                                               
Similarly, three factors with an eigenvalue 
greater than five explained 66% of the variance 
for the endogenous construct board-role 
performance using the principal factor analysis. 
Two items were removed from the scale. The 
varimax-rotated factor pattern implies that all the 
three factors  concerned – monitoring; service; 
and networking with the 11-item scale (a = 
0.893; KMO = 0.893; and < .001 Sig) measuring 
the construct present acceptable figures to build 
the latent construct board-role performance for 
further statistical analysis. The result of the EFA 
is shown in Table 3.
In the structural equation modelling (SEM), 
the measurement model is evaluated first to 
confirm the measurement adequacy of the items 
for the construct. The second stage involves 
the evaluation of the structural model, which 
shows a regression-like relationship between 
the constructs. This two-stage approach will 
overcome the problem of localizing the source 
of poor model fit associated with other single-
step approaches (Kline, 1998). However, 
before proceeding to the SEM data analysis, 
it is necessary to test the validity of the two 
constructs. Having ascertained both the internal 
consistency of the items (see Table 4), and the 
EFA test, the next section will discuss construct 
validity.      
Measurement Error in SEM
An important question is how do we represent 
theoretical concepts and then quantify the 
amount of measurement error? In this paper, the 
measurement model enabled us to use all the 
20 measured items to adequately define the two 
latent constructs, and then the model was used to 
assess the extent of measurement-error known as 
reliability. From the stakeholder’s perspective, 
creditor participation is complex, and can have 
many dimensions. Hence the design of the 11 
best items to measure the construct. However, 
in its most basic form, measurement-error is 
due to inaccurate responses, data entry errors, 
interpreting questions differently from what the 
researcher intended, or the natural degree of 
the respondents’ inconsistency when multiple 
items are used to measure same construct (Hair 
et al., 2010). With the application of CFA, 
it becomes easier to assess the contribution 
of each indicator and measure how well the 
combined set of indicators represents the latent 
constructs (reliability and validity). In this 
study, we were able to incorporate the extent 
of the measurement-error into the statistical 
estimation; thus we improved the structural 
model (see Figure 2).
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Composite Reliability
Reliability is an assessment of the degree of 
consistency between multiple measurements of 
a variable. The first measures we considered in 
this paper was the reliability coefficient, which 
assessed the entire scale, with Cronbach’s alpha 
(see Table 1) being the most widely used measure 
(Hair et al., 2010). Generally, reliability is 
inversely related to measurement-error. In other 
words, as reliability goes up, the relationships 
between a latent construct and the indicators are 
greater, meaning that the construct explains more 
of the variance in each indicator. If reliability 
is 1, i.e. 100%, then measurement-error is 0. 
But in statistical reality, no indicator items can 
perfectly define a latent construct. SEM offers 
the advantage of automatically accounting 
for measurement-errors. Also available are 
reliability measures derived from confirmatory 
factor analysis, such as the composite reliability. 
In Table 4, the range of the factor loadings for the 
construct creditor participation is 0.715 to 0.892. 
This is the correlation between the original 
construct and the indicator factors, with higher 
loadings making the construct representative of 
the factor. Squared-factor loadings indicate what 
percentage of the variance in an original construct 
is explained by a factor. For example, the 0.740 
loading on item risk1 explains 54.8% of the 
variance of the construct creditor participation. In 
sum, for all practical and statistical significance, 
factor loadings for the two latent constructs (20 
items) - creditor participation and board-role 
performance exceeded the 0.50 threshold set 
by Hair et al. (2010). Similar with the standard 
deviation of any set of data values, the standard 
error is the expected variation of an estimated 
regression coefficient, but instead denotes the 
expected range of the coefficient across multiple 
samples of the data. It is usually useful in statistical 
tests of significance that test to see whether the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
It has been affirmed by Hair et al. (2010) that 
reliability is also an indicator of convergent 
validity, and that different reliability coefficients 
do not produce dramatically different reliability 
estimates, but a slightly different composite 
reliability value. It is computed from the squared 
sum of factor loadings for each construct and the 
sum of the error variance terms for a construct 
as represented by A/A+B. The high composite 
reliability value of 0.907 confirms the assertion 
that sometimes Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
understates reliability (Hair et al., 2010).  
Table 4
Composite Reliability (Creditor Participation) 
Latent Variable Item 
Code
Factor 
Loading
(Factor 
Loading)²
Std. Error (FL)² + 
Std. Error
Composite 
Reliability
Creditor Advisory RS1 0.74 0.548 0.066 A/A+B
RS2 0.805 0.648 0.058
RS3 0.846 0.716 0.065
RS4 0.796 0.634 0.073
CL1 0.715 0.511 0.087
CL2 0.846 0.716 0.091
CL3 0.892 0.796 0.083
CL4 0.861 0.741 0.083
(continued)
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Latent Variable Item 
Code
Factor 
Loading
(Factor 
Loading)²
Std. Error (FL)² + 
Std. Error
Composite 
Reliability
CC1 0.836 0.699 0.053
CC2 0.838 0.702 0.047
CC3 0.763 0.582 0.044
A S 7.292 B	S 0.75  8.0422 0.907
Table 5
Composite Reliability (Board-role Performance)
Latent Variable Item 
Code
Factor 
Loading
(Factor 
loading)²
Std. 
Error B
S (FL)² +   
S	Std. Err
Composite 
Reliability
Board Performance MN1 0.788 0.621 0.054 A/A+B
MN2 0.85 0.722 0.067
MN3 0.696 0.484 0.057
SV1 0.68 0.462 0.063
SV2 0.86 0.739 0.063
SV3 0.686 0.471 0.065
SV4 0.789 0.623 0.056
NT1 0.6 0.360 0.065
NT2 0.762 0.581 0.064
A S 5.064 S 0.554  5.618 0.901
Convergent Validity
A measure may be internally consistent (reliable) 
but not accurate enough to measure a particular 
construct (valid). Construct validity is the extent 
to which a set of measured items actually reflects 
the theoretical latent construct those items 
are designed to measure (Hair et al., 2010). A 
fundamental assessment of construct validity 
involves the measurement of the relationships 
between items and constructs (i.e., the path 
estimates linking construct to indicator variables). 
In CFA application, larger standardized loading 
estimates confirm that the indicators are strongly 
related to their associated constructs and are a 
indication of construct validity. A rule of thumb 
suggests that standardized loading estimates 
should be at least .5 and ideally .7 or higher. 
Low loadings suggest that a measured variable 
is a candidate for deletion from the model 
(Hair et al., 2010). A more appropriate idea to 
discuss construct validity for CFA/SEM is the 
convergent validity. The items that are indicators 
of a specific construct should converge or share a 
high proportion of variance in common, known as 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010). One of the 
important ways available to estimate the relative 
amount of convergent validity is: high loadings 
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on a factor would indicate that they converge 
on a latent construct. Since the standardized 
parameter estimates are constrained to range 
between – 1.0 and + 1.0, Hair et al. (2010) stated 
that, a good rule of thumb is that standardized 
loading estimates (R) should have a regression 
weight of 0.5 or higher, and ideally 0.7 or higher. 
Looking at Tables 4 & 5 below, all the items have 
R value < 0.5. Also, with the exception of MN1, 
MN2, and RS1, with R values 0.600, 0.607, and 
0.613 respectively, all the other items have R ≤ 
0.7. The rationale behind this can be understood 
in each item’s communality, which represents 
the amount of variance accounted for by the 
factor solution for each item. In this paper, all 
the items have been assessed to meet acceptable 
levels of explanation, i.e. < 0.5.  The square of a 
standardized factor loading represents how much 
variation in an item is explained by the latent 
construct and is termed the variance extracted, 
sometimes referred to as squared multiple 
correlation (SMC). The result in the Table below 
indicate acceptable construct validity because 
the figure of 0.992 for construct reliability are > 
that of variance extracted, 0.931 for the construct 
board-role performance, and 0.978 for construct 
reliability are > that of variance extracted, 0.917.
Table 6
CR & VE: Board Performance
Item 
Code
Std. 
Loading
(Std. 
Loading)2
(S Std. 
Loading)2
S (Std. 
Loading)2
Std. 
Error
S Std. 
Error
Constr 
Relibty: 
A/A+B
Variance 
Extractd C/
C+B
MN 1 0.600 0.360 0.034
MN 2 0.607 0.368 0.053
MN 3 0.709 0.503 0.003
SV 1 0.700 0.489 0.038
SV 2 0.725 0.526 0.036
SV 3 0.727 0.529 0.038
SV 4 0.740 0.548 0.027
NT 1 0.757 0.573 0.036
NT 2 0.730 0.533 0.037
S 6.294 39.614  
(A)
4.427 
 (C)
0.329 
(B)
0.992 0.931
The Creditor Measurement Model (CFA)
In a CFA model, the Squared Multiple Correlation 
(SMC) values represent the extent to which a 
measured variable’s variance is explained by 
a latent construct. The rules provided for the 
factor standardized loading estimates tend to 
produce the same diagnostics because the SMC 
is a function of the loading estimates regardless 
of whether the researcher is estimating in a 
congeneric measurement model, CFA or path 
model with latent constructs (Holmes-Smith 
et al., 2005). In addition, a major component 
of construct validity is convergent validity – 
items that are indicators of a specific construct 
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Table 7
Creditor Participation
Variable 
&  Item 
Code
Std. 
Loading
(Std. 
Loading)2
(S Std. 
Loading)2
S (Std. 
Loading)2
Std. 
Error
S Std. 
Error
Constrc 
RelibltyA/
A+B
Varianc 
Extrctd: 
C/C+B
Creditor
RS 1 0.613 0.376 0.055
RS 2 0.754 0.569 0.036
RS 3 0.804 0.646 0.043
RS 4 0.729 0.531 8.41 
(A)
2.122
 (C)
0.058 0.192 
(B)
0.978 0.917
S 2.900
should converge or share a high proportion of 
variance in common. Factor loadings, variance 
extracted (or SMC), average variance extracted 
(AVE) and construct reliability are some of the 
available ways to estimate the relative amount of 
convergent validity. In general, researches report 
at least one of the three model-based estimates 
of reliability: construct reliability, SMC or VE 
(Bollen, 1989).  
In this paper, we estimated the relative amount 
of convergent validity because both construct 
reliability and variance extracted were shown 
(see Table 6), and also the SMC loadings were 
used to measure the construct validity (see 
Figure 3). As mentioned earlier, the SMC for a 
measured variable is the square of the indicator’s 
standardized loadings. In other words, from the 
default outputs in the SEM figures below, it is 
Figure 2. Initial creditor participation measurement (CFA) model.
Chisquare: 452.120
df: 44
Normed Chisquare: 10.275
CFI: .344
NFI: .333
TLI: .181
GFI: .623
AGFI: .435
RMSEA: .246
.01
.74
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estimated that the predictors of RS3 (indicator) 
explain 63% of its variance (i.e., the error 
variance of RS3 is approximately 37% of the 
variance of RS3 itself). Thus, the SMC value 
threshold of a good observed variable should be 
.5 and above (Hair et al. 2010). Nevertheless, 0.3 
indicates an acceptable item variable (Holmes-
Smith et al., 2005) especially when the indicators 
for a construct are not more than 3 provided other 
constructs have higher indicators. A standardized 
factor loading of 0.7 for an observed variable 
is roughly the equivalent of 0.5 SMC. From 
the CFA analysis of the creditor measurement 
model, seven items present offending estimates. 
The remaining items of R1, R2, R3, and R4 
are retained based on the AMOS modification 
indices output, as shown below.  
Figure 3. Creditor participation measurement (CFA) model after modification.
Figure 4. Initial board performance measurement (CFA) model.
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Measures of Fit
Before analysing the structural model, it is 
necessary to understand how to evaluate the 
models. Fit measures are grouped into various 
types and each has its specific capability in 
model evaluation: (a) measures of parsimony, for 
example degree of freedom (df) is one of the fit 
measures used for simplicity and goodness of fit; 
(b) minimum sample discrepancy function, for 
example, the Chi-Square statistic is an overall 
measure of how many of the implied moments and 
sample moments differ. The Chi-Square statistic 
(χ2) is the minimum value of the discrepancy 
divided by its degree of freedom. The ratio 
should be close to 1 for correct models (Arbuckle, 
2005), or should not exceed 3 before it can be 
accepted (Byrne, 2010). Since the Chi-Square is 
sensitive to sample size, it is necessary to look at 
other measures that also support goodness of fit. 
The Chi-Square statistic is an overall measure of 
how many of the implied moments and sample 
moments differ. Another example is the p-value, 
which is the probability of getting as large a 
discrepancy as that which occurred with the 
present sample under appropriate distributional 
assumptions and assuming a correctly specified 
model. So, a ρ-value is a method to select the 
Figure 5. Board performance measurement (CFA) model after modification.
model by testing the hypothesis to eliminate 
any model that is inconsistent with the available 
data or that which does not fit perfectly in the 
population; (c) measures based on the population 
discrepancy, for example, the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) is most 
commonly used, and the figure should be < 0.05 
to achieve model fit; (d) comparison to a baseline 
model. Three significant indices are Normed fit 
index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), CFI, 
AGFI, and (e) goodness of fit index (GFI) and 
related measures (Arbuckle, 2005; Byrne 2010; 
& Holmes-Smith, 2005). However, Arbuckle 
(2005) affirmed that model evaluation is one 
of the most difficult and unsettled issues in 
structural equation modelling. In this paper, all 
the fit measures have been tested and some of the 
indicators (especially the offending estimates) 
had to be removed for both the CFA and the 
structural models before achieving the criteria 
for model fit (see summary in Table 8 below).
The fit indices of the board performance 
measurement model in Figure 5 are summarized. 
The  measurement model after modification 
indicates that χ2 is 12.102 with 8 degrees of 
freedom (d.f.) and p-value = .147, which is an 
improvement compared to the initial hypothesized 
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model (Figure 6) with p-value = 0.000 since 
to be statistically significant, the threshold 
for the p-value has to be > 0.05. However, in 
practice, the χ2 is very sensitive to sample size 
and frequently results in the rejection of a well-
fitting model. Hence, the ratio of χ2 over d.f. has 
been recommended as a better goodness of fit 
than χ2 (Hair et al ., 2010). A common level of 
χ2/d.f. ratio is below 5 (though below 3 is better). 
The χ2/d.f. is 1.302 (i.e. 12.102/8), indicating 
very good fit. Furthermore, other indicators of 
goodness of fit are CFI = .990, TLI = .981, GFI 
= .959, NFI = .971, AGFI = .933 and RMSEA = 
.058. A comparison of this result with the critical 
values in the output estimates, suggests that the 
model fits the empirical data well, thus indicating 
very reliable and valid measures of the two latent 
constructs. 
Table 6
Model Goodness of Fit Indices
Criteria Indicators: CFA Model Indicators:
Structural Model
χ2
χ2/df
/ρ > 0.05
< 5
12.102/0.147
1.513
33.845/0.139
1.302
Fit Indices: GFI
                  
> 0.9 0.959 0.959
                    AGFI > 0.9 0.933 0.928
                    NFI > 0.9 0.971 0.937
                    TLI > 0.9 0.981 0.978
Alternative Indices: CFI
                   
> 0.95 0.990 0.984
                      RMSEA < 0.05 0.058 0.044
                      RMR        < 0.05 0.017 0.031
The proposed theoretical model in Figure 1 was 
tested based on the theoretical argument relating 
the two latent constructs: creditor participation 
and board-role performance. Factors of protect 
risky contracts, protect collateral, and enforce 
credit contracts were used in the 11 indicators 
measuring creditor participation, while board 
monitoring role, board service role and board 
networking role were the indicators of board-
role performance. Employing the use of AMOS 
version 16 among the 20 measurement items as 
input, the SEM analysis was conducted to examine 
the relationship between each of the constructs 
as hypothesised. The final hypothesised results 
of the SEM analysis are depicted in Figure 7. 
The fit indices of the overall hypothesized model 
in Figure 7 are summarized. The measurement 
model after modification indicates that χ2 is 
33.845 with 26 degrees of freedom (d.f.) and 
p-value = .139, which is an improvement 
compared to the initial hypothesized model 
(Figure 6) with p-value = 0.000 since to be 
statistically significant, the threshold for the 
p-value has to be > 0.05. However, in practice, 
the χ2 is very sensitive to sample size and 
frequently results in the rejection of a well-
fitting model. Hence, the ratio of	χ2 over d.f. has 
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been recommended as a better goodness of fit 
than χ2 (Hair et al ., 2010). A common level of 
χ2/d.f. ratio is below 5 (though below 3 is better). 
The χ2/d.f. is 1.302 (i.e. 33.845/26), indicating 
very good fit. Furthermore, other indicators of 
goodness of fit are CFI = .984, TLI = .978, GFI 
= .959, NFI = .937, AGFI = .928 and RMSEA = 
.044. A comparison of this result with the critical 
values in the output estimates, suggests that the 
model fits the empirical data well, thus indicating 
very reliable and valid measures of the two latent 
constructs. 
   Figure 6. Initial hypothesised structural model.
 
   Figure 7. Hypothesized creditor participation structural model. 
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The default model table below shows the 
regression weights for the two latent constructs 
in relation to the statistical significance of their 
measured items. The *** sign under column 
‘P’ indicates that the probability for getting a 
critical ratio as large as 6.851 in absolute value 
is less than 0.001. In other words, the regression 
weight for creditor participation in the prediction 
of risk2 is significantly different from zero at 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
risk1 <--- Creditor_Participation 1.000
risk2 <--- Creditor_Participation 1.065 .155 6.851 *** par_1
risk3 <--- Creditor_Participation 1.335 .186 7.185 *** par_2
risk4 <--- Creditor_Participation 1.322 .195 6.778 *** par_3
encc1 <--- Creditor_Participation .341 .120 2.845 .004 par_4
mntrg3 <--- Board-role_Performance 1.000
serv1 <--- Board-role_Performance 1.340 .174 7.698 *** par_5
serv2 <--- Board-role_Performance 1.365 .176 7.762 *** par_6
serv3 <--- Board-role_Performance 1.343 .179 7.501 *** par_7
ntwrk2 <--- Board-role_Performance 1.200 .172 6.980 *** par_8
*** P value is statistically significant at 0.01 level
the 0.001 level (two-tailed). Similarly for the 
construct board-role performance, the critical 
ratio as large as 7.698 in absolute value is less 
than 0.001. In other words, the regression weight 
for board-role performance in the prediction of 
serv1 is significantly different from zero at the 
0.001 level (two-tailed). The only exception is 
encc1, which is significantly different from zero 
at the 0.005 (two-tailed).
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper began by arguing that significant 
creditors are major stakeholders in business 
organizations. Like other contractual 
stakeholders, they help in generating wealth by 
providing the short-term and long-term financial 
loans the corporations require, which can be 
termed as the nucleus of the organizations. 
Though a number of scholars have used other 
factors to raise the importance of suppliers of 
finance in the corporate governance structure; 
a typical example is the well-known survey in 
the US shareholder’s viewpoint by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), and the stakeholder’s viewpoint 
in studies of Japanese corporations (Okabe, 
2004), or in comparative studies as in Aoki 
(2001). A central claim of this paper is that 
board- role performance is a key mechanism 
of corporate governance that is shaped by the 
structural forces of sharing a firm’s decision 
processes at the top. In that context, the country’s 
legal provisions (as in Germany), or the firms’ 
conventional norms (as in Japan) are the major 
sites of considerations. Though it is difficult to 
say which of the approaches is superior to the 
other, it can be rightly affirmed that financing of 
firms through the main banks provide a basis for 
bringing on board the lenders’ strategic advice 
especially on important issues such as the need 
to protect the borrowing firm from entering high 
risk contracts, protect collateral, and ensure that 
credit contracts are enforced. 
An important finding in this study is that 
the proposed manifest variables of the latent 
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construct creditor participation (exogenous 
variable) – protect high risk contracts, protect 
collateral, and enforce credit contracts have been 
confirmed to be acceptable measures of creditor 
participation. Similarly, for the construct board-
role performance (endogenous variable), the 
proposed indicator variables – board monitoring 
role, board service role, and board networking 
role have been confirmed to be good measures of 
the construct. However, board service role items 
are stronger because three items are retained 
after all the modification processes to achieve 
model fit. In addition, after performing the CFA, 
only four items in the dimension protect high risk 
contracts were retained.    
Within the overall model, the estimates of the 
structural coefficients provide the basis for testing 
the proposed hypotheses. As expected, creditor-
participation factors are significantly related 
to board-role performance, thus supporting 
the proposed hypotheses. In other words, the 
regression weights for creditor participation 
in the prediction of board-role performance 
is significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level. This study findings confirm the works of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Aoki (2005); Aoki 
and Patrick (1994); Jackson and Moerke (2005); 
Jackson (2005); and Chaithanakiji (2008). 
Hence, the research objective of determining 
whether creditor participataion is significantly 
related to board-role performance has been 
achieved, hence answering the research question 
in the affirmative, consistent with the literature.  
In Nigeria however, section 19 (2) of Banks 
and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), 
provides that, no person who is a director of any 
other or any company that holds more than 10% 
of the total voting rights of the bank can be a 
director of the bank except with the approval of 
the bank. In addition, “no bank shall be managed 
by a person who is – a director of any other 
company not being a subsidiary of the bank, 
or engaged in any other business or vocation.” 
With the limitation of the law in perspective, it is 
time for Nigerian firms to come up with realistic 
legislation or develop empirical researches on 
the way forward in respect of the most suitable 
financial system and governance structure as 
an alternative arrangement for the emerging 
society. This is in recognition of the literature 
backing that, the participatory role of a financier 
(bank or any debt investor) to companies largely 
depends on the prevailing legal framework in 
the country. For example, Jackson and Moerke 
(2005) observed that despite broad similarities in 
Germany and Japan, the legal framework is a key 
area of difference. The two-tier board system in 
Germany reflects strong legal intervention into 
the internal make-up of the enterprise in order to 
promote effective checks and balances between 
management and shareholders.
In this regard, the monetary policy committee 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria recently unveiled 
new measures to stabilize the banking sector to 
ensure stable and sound banking with minimal 
risk. This step is strategic because it will enforce 
desired predictable behaviour by the banks. 
Secondly, CBN’s action may not be unconnected 
with the recent measures to bear risks at their 
barest minimum, after last year’s failures in the 
system. Such memories make special precautions 
economically and politically appealing, because 
public confidence is crucial for the banks to 
succeed. In this regard, incentives and controls 
are necessary. They allow the banks to create 
credit in order to allocate it to socially desirable 
ends. 
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